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1 INTRODUCTION
In which way does Artic1e 1 Protocol No. 1 add anything to this constitu-
tional guarantee? To give an answer to this question we should explain
Expropriation may take place only in the public interest and on prior assurance of full
compensation, in accordance with regulations laid down by or pursuant to Act of
Parliament.
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No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of intemationallaw.
This, however, shall not hamper the State to enforce such laws as it deerns necessary to
control the use of property (again: in accordance with the general interest) or to secure
the payment of taxes and other contributions or penalties.
Artic1e 1 Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) stipulates the right of every naturalor legal person to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. The text of this provision can be paraphrased
as fol1ows:
In this contribution we will not further elaborate on the levying of taxes and
the summary execution which is sometimes necessary in this respect', we
limit ourselves to expropriation. Long before Protocol No. 1 provided for the
proteetion of property, the Netherlands - as well as many other European
countries - already knew a constitutional provision concerning the pro-
tection of property. The first paragraph of this provision, Section 14 of the
Constitution, reads:
7
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something about the contents of Artiele 1 and on the applicability of
international human rights instruments in the Netherlands legal order. We
will start with the latter.
After having been approved by Act of 28 [uly 19542, the ECHR and
Protocol No. 1 were ratified by the Netherlands on 31 August 1954.3 The
relationship between international law and domestic law is regulated in a
monistic way by the Dutch Constitution (since the revision of 1953). Section
93 of the Constitution provides that provisions of treaties and resolutions by
international institutions, the contents of which may be binding on all
persons, shall have this binding effect after they have been published. The
qualification die naar hun inhoud een ieder kunnen verbinden [the contents of
which may be binding on all persons] is generally understood to refer to the
self-executing character which is required for their application by Dutch
courts. The rights contained in the ECHR are generally considered self-
executing by the courts. For Artiele 1 this was fust determined by the
Afdeling Rechtspraak van de Raad van State [judicial Division of the Councilof
State] in 1979.4 According to Section 94 of the Dutch Constitution statutory
regulations in force within the Kingdom shall not be applicable if such
application is in conflict with provisions of treaties that are binding on all
persons or of resolutions by international institutions. The Dutch courts
have therefore to give preeedenee to self-executing treaty provisions over
domestic law that is not in conformity therewith, be it antecedent or
posterior, statutory or constitutional law." This is an exception within the
Dutch constitutional system, for the Constitution contains a bar on judicial
review (Section 120, dating back to 1848). The odd consequence of this is
that statutory law (i.e. Acts of Parliament) cannot be reviewed for
compatibility with the Constitution, whereas it should be reviewed by the
courts for compatibility with self-executing treaty law,"
2 Stb. 1954,no. 335.
3 Tractatenblad [Dutch.Treaty Series]1951,no. 154;1952,no. 80;1954,nos. 151and 152.
4 ARRS31 July 1979,AB 1979,539 (De Moor/Terschelling).
5 J.G. Polakiewicz, 'The Implementation of the ECI-IR in Western Europe. A Survey of National
Law and Practice', in: E.A. Alkema et al (eds.), The Domestic Implementation of the European
Convention on Human Rights in Eastern and Western Europe (All-European Human Rights
Yearbook (1992), vol. 2), Keh1/Strasbourg/Arlington: Engel 1993, p. 32-34. See also E.A.
Alkema, 'The Effectsof the European Convention on Human Rights and Other International
Human Rights Jnstruments on the Netherlands LegalOrder', in: R. Lawson & M. de Blois
(eds.), The Dynamics of the Proteetion ofHuman Rights in Europe (Essays in Honour of Henry G.
Schermers, vol. ill), Dordrecht/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 1994, p. 1-14; P. van Dijk,
'Domestic Status of Human Rights Treaties and the Attitude of the Judiciary - The Dutch
Case', in: M Nowak et al (OOs.), Progress in the Spirit of Human Rights (Festschrift für Felix
Ermacora), Keh1/Strasbourg/Arlington: Engel 1988, p. 631-650; E.A. Alkema, 'Foreign
Relations in the Netherlands Constitution of 1983', NILR1984 (vol. XXXI), P:307-331.
6 Alkema 1994,supra note 5, P:3.
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Coming to the contents of Artiele 1, we briefly reiterate that this Artiele
contains three separate rules or principles. The fust is that of peaceful
enjoyment of one's possessions. The second allows for the deprivation of
possessions by the proper authorities under certain restrictions. The third
concerns the control and regulation of the use of property by the
administration. All governmental activities should be in accordance with the
general interest, so it is only natural that this is explicitly mentioned as a
essential condition for State interference with private property.
For further information on the structure of the Artiele and on the scope
of proteetion we refer to the well-known commentaries to the ECHR.7 and the
contributions in this volume by Hartlief and Alkema: all rights which are
well-founded in national law can basically benefit from the guarantee of
Artiele 1; they may be claims, contractual rights with a certain economie
value, immaterial rights or even rights granted under public law (such as a
licence to serve alcoholic beverages or an exploitation concession). Even
pension rights or social security rights may be protected by Artiele 1.8
The third principle of Artiele 1 is of importance, because in practice it
applies to situations of de facto expropriation. A related and also important
question is whether (partial) deprivation of (a) the power to dispose of
certain possessions or (b) the possibility to use them, should always be
accompanied by a tull compensation of damages.
In the following some aspects of the Dutch legislation conceming
expropriation (including legislation that provides for obligations to tolerate
and restrictions of use) will be further discussed from the perspective of
Artiele 1. However, also Artiele 6 ECHR. plays a role in this respect. We will
start our survey with this Article.
2 THE INFLUENCE OF ARTICLE 6 ECHR ON TIIE DUTCH LEGISLATION CONCERNING
EXPROPRIATION
Since the Benthem judgment of the European Court of Human Rights
(EcrtHR)9 - a judgment that, although it concerned a situation under the
Hinderwet [Nuisance Act], regarded the position of the Crown as instanee of
appeal in administrative cases - the Dutch Supreme Court has radically
7 A.H. Robertson & J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe. A StudyoftheEuropean Convention on
Human Rights, Manchester/New York: Manchester University Press 1993; D.J. Harris, M.
O'Boyle & C. Warbrick, Lato of the European Convention on Human Rights, London: Sweet &
Maxwell 1995; J.A. Frowein & W. Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar, Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington:
Engel 1995; P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights, The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff 1998.
8 ECrtHR 16 September 1996(Gaygusuz/Austria), RJ&D 1996-N, no. 14, p. 1129.
9 ECrtHR 23 October 1985 (Benthem/The Netherlands), Series A vol. 97.
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altered its opinion on the degree of scrutiny to be applied by the courts
when reviewing governmental expropriation decisions." The ECrtHR ruled
that the Crown (the King together with the responsible Minister, in this case
the Minister of Public Health and Environmental Protection) did not comply
with the demands Artiele 6 sets out for judicial control of decisions
concerning 'the determination of civil rights or obligations'. The Crown was
designated as the appellate body by Section 29 of the Nuisance Act 1952.
Decisions of the Crown (Royal Decrees) in appeal cases were final." Before
the Crown made a decision, it had to consult the Afdeling Geschillen van
Bestuur [Administrative Disputes Division] of the Council of State. This
Division enjoyed the same independent statu.s as a court and conducted its
proceedings in a more or less judicial marmer, However, the decision on
appeal was not made by this Division but by the Crown itself, which in most
cases followed the Division's advice, but had the possibility to deviate from
it. Since, in actu.al fact it was the Minister who took the decision in appeal,
the Crown was considered not to be a really 'independent and impartial
tribunal' in the sense of Artiele 6(1) ECHR.12
The Benthem judgment had immediate consequences for all situations in
which the Crown was the designated appellate body (mainly environmental
cases and cases concerning bestemmingsplannen [local zoning plans]). The
main consequence was that a new Act was enforced, the Tijdelijke Wet Kroon-
geschillen [Temporary Crown Litigation Act], which empowered the Admin-
istrative Disputes Division of the Council of State for an interim period of
five years to take a binding decision in cases where appeal lied to the Crown
(instead of only giving advice)." This matter now is regulated in a more
permanent way in the Algemene wet bestuursrecht [General Administrative
Law Act] and the (revised) Wet op de Raad van State [Act on the Council of
State]. Since 1994 in most administrative disputes the newly formed Afdeling
bestuursrechtspraak [Administrative Law Division] of the Council of State
functions as appellate judge and in some cases as judge of fust (and final)
instance. The latter is true for most cases in which the Crown formerly was
10 See P.C.E. van Wijmen, 'De rechter en het Koninklijk onteigeningsbesluit', in: Th.G.
Drupsteen a.o, (eds.), Rechtsvonning in de sociale rechtsstaat (Essays in honour of P. de Haan),
Deventer: Kluwer 1989,p. 307-323.
11 Appeal from Crown decisions to an ordinary court was excluded by the Dutch Supreme
Court in its case law, based on the opinion that the Crown appeal procedure itself offered
sufficient guarantees for a fair hearing in the last instance. Appeal to the Afdeling Rechtspraak
van de Raad van State was expressly barred by Section 5(a) of the Wet Administratieve
Rechtspraak Overheidsbeschikkingen [Administrative Jurisdiction Act].
12 P. van Dijk, 'The Benthem Case and its Aftermath in The Netherlands', NILR 1987 (vol.
XXXIV), p. 5-24,especially p. 5-6.
13 The Temporary Crown Litigation Act entered into force on 1 [anuary 1989.
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the appellate body, such as environmental cases and town & country
planning cases.
So far, this had very little to do with expropriation procedures. The role
of the Crown in the administrative expropriation procedure - the procedure
for the administrative body that intended to expropriated something to
obtain a writ of expropriation - was not even pseudo-judicial. The Crown
simply sanctioned the expropriation decision of a lower administrative body
(this was the case with expropriations on the basis of Title IV of the
Onteigeningswet [Expropriation Act]) or took itself the expropriation decision
(this was the case with expropriations on the basis of Titles Ila-c of the
Expropriation Act). In both situations 'the Council of State' was being
'consulted', meaning the full Council and not only (like before) the Admin-
istrative Disputes Division of (like today) the Administrative Law Division.
Nowadays, someone who's goods have been expropriated can put rus
complaints before the Crown, but there will be no procedure before the
Council of State. The Minister concemed will be directly responsible himself
for the Royal Decree permitting for the expropriation.
In the perspective of the oid situation and in the face of the Benthem
judgment it is easy to understand that the Supreme Court came to the
opinion that courts judging in expropriation cases should not only review
formal and procedural aspects of the decision (such as the plans being left
open for inspeetion by the public, the observance of fixed terms and time
limits), but also material aspects, whenever the appellant so desires. Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court the judge should answer questions such as: Is the
expropriation necessary and in accordance with the general interest? Is it
urgent and imperative?
However, what if the expropriation decision is part of a broader order",
for instanee a tracébesluit [order of an administrative authority on the route
of a motorway or railroad] or projectbesluit [order of an administrative auth-
ority on the planning of an important infrastructure, such as an airport] that
could have been judged by an independent and impartial court in an earlier
instance? In such a case the court that is called to judge the expropriation
order does not need to scrutinise the material aspects of that order again.
This will already have been done by another court in a procedure against
the broader order, which makes that the demands of Artic1e 6 ECHR have
been met with. Or it could have been done, had the appellant appealed
against the broader order. If the appellant did not do so, the order of which
the expropriation order is a part will have formele rechtskracht [1egal force]. A
14 According to Dutch administrative law an 'order' can be defined as a written ruling of an
administrative authority constituting a juristic act under public law. A 'decision' is an order
which is not of a genera! nature.
3 DE FACTO-EXPROPRIATION BYMEANS OF AN OBLIGATION Ta TOLERATE
court called upon to judge such an order will not quash it anymore, neither
for procedural failures nor for reasons of its content."
15 HR 16 May 1986, NJ 1986,no, 723, annotated by M. Scheltema (Gem. Heeseh/Van den Akker).
16 Act of 13 May 1927, Stb. 1927, no. 159. See also Stb. 1991, no. 607 (new publication after
revision of the Act).
17 However, Section 12 of the Waterstaatswet 1900 [Act on Pulic Works and Water Management
1900]holds a provision similar to that of Section 4 of the Act on the Remaval of Obstructions
of a Private Law Character. See ARRS 25 [une 1990, AB 1991, 228j ARRS 24 August 1991, AB
1992,169.
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Especially in the sphere of public facilities (railroads, telecommunication,
energy supply, the mains system, other cable and pipe networks, water
management) the Dutch legal system imposes on owners the obligation to
tolerate that certain structures or constmctions are build on or under their
estate. Sometimes such an obligation to tolerate comes close to a de facto
expropriation. An example of this is the provision in Section 4 of the Belem-
meringenwet Privaatrecht [Act on the Removal of restrictions under Private
Law 1927].16 One could say that with this Act the legislature anticipated on
situations where Artiele 1 could have consequences. Section 4 of the Act
provides that whenever it is decided that an obligation to tolerate should be
brought to rest upon a certain property, everyone who is entitled to this
property can dispute this order before the court of appeal and ask to quash
it on the ground that it has been unjustly considered that (1) the interests of
the ones entitled to the property do not reasonably demand that the prop-
erty be expropriated completely, or (2) the use of the property is not ob-
stmcted more then reasonably necessary for building, maintaining, chang-
ing or transferring the structure of construction.
For us now the first clause is the most interesting one, Owners or others
entitled to a certain property can appeal to the court and ask to quash the
decision on the obligation to tolerate because this decision de facto mounts
up to expropriation. If the responsibie administrative authority nevertheless
wants to build the structure or construction on this property, it should
follow the procedure of the Expropriation Act, which includes the guarantee
of a full compensation.
Other Acts that impose obligations to tolerate (such as the different Acts
on public works and water management and the Wet op de Telecommunicatie-
voorzieningen [Telecommunications Facilities Act]) do not contain such a
provision." In our opinion a court that is confronted with a plea as meant in
Section 4 of the Act on the removal of Restrictions under Private Law 1927,
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should scrutinise the decision on the obligation to tolerate to see whether it
should be quashed. This all as a consequence of Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1. The
court that will have to do this, will be the court that is designated to judge
on the damages that are caused by the obligation to tolerate. All Acts
imposing obligations to tolerate provide for a procedure to settle disputes
on the amount of damage caused by building and maintaining the structure
or construction. In these procedures advisory opinions by experts play an
important role, but they always end with a 'day in court'. Sometimes this is
the kantongerecht [subdistrict court], sometimes it is the rechtbank [district
court]. Before this court the appellant can object to the decision to place him
under an obligation to tolerate and demand to be expropriated on the basis
of the Expropriation Act. His claim can be based on a reasoning that is
comparable to Section 4 of the Act on the removal of Restrictions under
Private Law 1927and he can also refer to the self-executingness of Artiele 1
Protocol No. land Artiele 6 ECHR. In our opinion, in such a case the court
will have to judge on this objection or claim fust, before (possibly) coming to
a judgment on the amount of damage resulting from the obligation to
tolerate.
Developing this line of reasoning somewhat further, it can be argued
that also in some other situations Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1 can be part of a
ground for 'a right to expropriation' .18 On of these situations is the one in
which the Government has decided to expropriate a certain property and
has published this intention (which is obliged by the Expropriation Act), but
does not start the court procedure to obtain the official title for expropriation
(or cancels this procedure altogether). This may lead to damages on the side
of the owner of the property, for the publication of the intention to
expropriate will certainly decrease the value of the property or even make it
impossible to sell it.
Another situation is the one in which a certain neighbourhood in a large
city is subject to urban renewal. The process of urban renewal is costly and
develops only slowly. During this process, owners of shops and other
businesses in the neighbourhood often experience a decrease of income and
a decrease of the value of their property as a result of the high number of
people moving from the neighbourhood (on the instigation of the
authorities) and a high number of unoccupied houses. It may take years
before it is the turn of their street or their premises to be renewed. What
should the owners do in such a situation? If they leave the neighbourhood
they no longer have a right to compensation in an expropriation procedure."
If they stay - running the risk of bankruptcy in the mean time - they can
18 E. van der Schans, 'Recht op onteigening', BR1993,p. 433-435.
19 I-m.17 February 1954,NI1954,no. 212 (Grootebroek/Rood).
4 DEPRIVATION OF POSSESSIONS WITHOUT FULL COMPENSATION?
legitimate objects of public interest, such as pursued in measures of economie reform or
measures designed to achieve greater social justice, may call for less than reimbursement
of the full market value."
In principle and apart from additional reimbursements, the ca1culation of
the compensation to be paid in case of expropriation is based on the 'full
market value' of the property. Deprivation of property without a compen-
sation based on this principle will normally be seen as a disproportionate
interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and thus as a
violation of Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1. However, Artiele 1 does not guarantee
a right to full compensation under all circumstances, since
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only hope that when the expropriation procedure for their premises finally
commences they will be compensated not only for the loss of their property
but also for the lack of income in the 'waiting period', Sometimes, however,
this kind of compensation is not offered for it is held against theowners that
they did not reduce their losses by moving their business from the
neighbourhood to another place."
The Strasbourg case law makes clear that a Government that leaves its
civilians insecure for years on the exact action that it is going to undertake
towards certain property, may very well violate Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1 by
doing this," FoIlowing this line from the case law it could also be argued
that Artiele 1 - in certain circumstances - obliges the authorities to start
formal expropriation procedures in court at an earlier stage, thus opening
the door to full compensation on the basis of the Expropriation Act.
20 Van der Schans 1993, supra note 18, P: 434; Theexisting practice of administrative compen-
sation in The Netherlands focuses on compensation for disproportional suffering by an
interested party as a result of a certain governmental order or decision. The behaviour of that
interested party playsa role in the assesment of the amount of compensation. See further § 5
of this Article.
21 ECrU-IR 23 September 1982(Sporrong and Lönnroth/Sweden), Series A vol, 52.
22 ECrtI-IR 21 February 1986(James & others/UK), Series A vol. 98; ECrtHR 8 July 1986 (Lithgow &
others/UK), Series A vol. 102, § 121.
23 The rights meant in this Section are La. building and planting rights, rights to leasehold,
In our view the criteria for deprivation of possessions without full
compensation should also include measures to proteet the environment and
measures to preserve nature. It is our opinion that measures in these fields
may justify deprivation of property or patrimonial rights without full com-
pensation, except when the measures mount to deprivation of property
senso strictu or of rights as meant in Section 3 of the Expropriation Act.23 In
these two situations full compensation is obligatory.
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Such a system holds an advantage for 'victims' of deprivation decisions.
It will be easier to accept a causal conneetion between the fact or decision
causing the damage and the damage itself. On the other hand this system
will imply acceptance of criteria like 'accepted risk within society' and
'entrepreneur's risk' to moderate the sum of compensation which is
impossible in the current expropriation procedures. Because it is easier to
establish a causal connection, compensation will be paid earlier. This
compensation may however be moderated when the fact or decision causing
the damage faUs within the victim's normaUy accepted risk within society.
5 ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL No. lAND SECTION 3:4, PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE GENERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ACT
Referring to the travaux préparatoires, it can very well be said that Section
3:4, § 2 of the Algemene wet bestuursrecht [General Administrative Law Act]
(Awb) gives ground to the payment of administrative compensation when
an interested party suffers disproportionately from a certain order. Section
3:4, § 2, provides that the adverse consequences of an order for one or more
interested parties may not be disproportionate to the purposes served by the
order. This principle of (dis)proportionality can also be found in Artiele 1
Protocol No. I, for instanee Holy Monasteries/Greece of 9 December 1994:24
Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment
whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether
it does not impose disproportionate burden on the applicants. In this connection, the
taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will
normally constitute a disproportionate interference and a totallaek of eompensation ean
be eonsidered justifiable under Artiele 1 only in exeeptional circumstances.
Seen from this perspective Section 3:4, § 2, Awb forms a solid base for the
payment of administrative compensation. This already was mentioned in
the explanatory memorandum to the Bill holding general rules of
administrative law," Dutch legal literature describes several principles of
proper administration on which Section 3:4, § 2, Awb could be based: the
duty of care principle, the obligation to balance interests, the principle of
equality (égalité des individues devant les charges publiques), the principle of
proportionality (as it can be found in the Holy Monasteries-judgment and
therefore in Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1). By explicitly considering Section 3:4, §
2, Awb as a consequence of the proteetion of property in European human
usufruct and tenancy rights.
24 ECrtHR 9 December 1994(Holy Monasteries/Greece), Series A vol. 310-A.
25 Kamerstukken 11 [OfficialReports of the Lower House of the States General] 1991-1992,21221,
no, 3, p. 70-71.
7 THE INFLUENCE OF ARTICLE 1 PROTOCOL No. 1 IN THE NETHERLANDS LEGAL
ORDER: THE EXAMPLE OF TIIE PIG-BREEDINGCONFLICT
6 OWNERSIDP FLOWING PRaM PUBLIC LAW DECISIONS OR PRIVATE LAW
REGULATIONS
rights law - specifically in case of an interference by an administrative
authority that mounts up to de facto expropriation - this basis can only be
strengthened.
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In the Netherlands we have experienced (and still are experiencing) a
conflict between the Minister of Agriculture and the pig-breeding industry
in which the questions mentioned in the foregoing paragraph are highly
topical. At the heart of the conflict lies the Wet herstucturering varkenshouderij
[Restructuring Act for the Pig-Breeding Industry]. This Acts aims to reduce
the number of breeding pigs in the Netherlands by some 25% by
An aspect that may be relevant in this respect is the question whether
one has become owner of certain 'rights' - for instanee the right to exploit a
gravel pit - without having to do something in return or not. Also, when
someone has paid certain amounts of money to an administrative authority
(for instanee retributions or municipal taxes on encroachments over public
land) to obtain 'rights' flowing from a certain permit, license or concession
there is a good reason to pay compensation in case of a (de facto) deprivation
of these 'rights'.
For the question whether a full or only a limited compensation should be
paid it might make a difference whether the deprivation of property
concerns possessions based on public law decisions or on private law
regulations. When someone is being deprived of a public law concession or
permit, the payment of only a limited sum of compensation may be
acceptable. In case of a 'classic' expropriation (based on the Expropriation
Act) this is impossible. The 'rights' that may be expropriated can be found in
Section 3 of the Expropriation Act. These rights are all based on private law
regulations and they may - according to the Act - not be expropriated
without full compensation, even when the expropriation is instigated by
measures of economie reform, measures designed to achieve greater social
justice or measures to proteet the environment and measures to preserve
nature.
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introducing 'pig-breeding rights',26 These 'rights' are distributed to the pig
breeders in such a way that each breeder obtains a number of rights equal to
the number of pigs that were bred at his farm in 1995or 1996. The rights can
be traded from one breeder to another.
Subsequentlyr the Act regulates that there will be a general reduction of
breeding rights of first 10% and later another 15%.. thus gradually
decreasing the number of pigs breeders are allowed to produce. From the
beginningr the breeding industry complained that this reduction would
make it impossible for large numbers of breeders to acquire enough income..
so they would be threatened with bankruptcy. The breeding industry
pleaded that - at the very least - there should be some kind of compensation
(in money) for the reduction of the breeding rights. Although some
amendments were made during the parliamentary debater when entering
into force at 28 September 1998 the Act did not provide for any form of
compensation."
The result was a tort procedure before the District Court in The Hague,
in which the pig-breeding industry inter alia claimed that the State of the
Netherlands constituted a violation of Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1 by the
entering into force and the enforcement of the Restructuring Act. The court
went along with the argument of the pig-breeding industry that the
breeding rights should be seen as 'possessions' in the sense of Artiele 1.
Referring to the Holy Monasteries judgment the district court decided that
deprivation of possessions without payment of an amount reasonably
related to its value normally constitutes a disproportionate interference and
a totallack of compensation could be considered justifiable under Artiele 1
only in exceptional circumstances. Since the Government had not urged
such exceptional circumstances, the district court judged the Act indeed
constituted a violation of Protocol No. 1 and decided that the part of the Act
regulating the breeding rights should not be enforced without a fair
compensation to the pig-breeding industry for their losses."
Soon after this judgment, which was taken to the Court of Appeal by the
State, a discussion started in Dutch legalliterature whether it was right to
interpret the reduction of breeding rights as a 'deprivation' of possessions.
26 A reduction that is necessary to comply with EC Directive 91/676/EEC on the protection of
water against pollutionby nitrates from agricultural sources.
27 Although there were some fierce debates in parliament on exactly this aspect of the
government's plans, the BID was accepted by bath Chambers of the States General. Same
time later the press revealed stories of Members of Parliament from the coalition parties
being put under heavy pressure from the Minister of Agriculture to accept the BID.
28 RbDen Haag, 23 December 1998, NfCM-Bulletin 1999, p. 494-511, annotated by T. Barkhuysen
and M.L.van Emmerik. Also published in JB 1999, no. 35.
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Should it not be seen as 'control of use' of property? If the latter were the
case, it was argued that compensation would be less obligatory."
Indeed, the Strasbourg case law seems to indicate that where State
interference with property is deemed to take the form of a control of use,
there is no presumption in favour of (full) compensation. The availability of
compensation is just one of the factors that has to be taken into account in
determining whether a fair balance has been struck between the public
interest and the individual's rights." However, it is difficult to distinguish
c1ear lines in the case law of the Strasbourg organs. One the one hand there
are some cases where it has been conc1uded that a fair balance has been
struck between private and public interests notwithstanding a failure to
compensate for a reduction of the value of the property affected." The
subject-matter of such cases inc1udes leasehold reform legislation which
reduced the value of the applicants' freehold property": the revocation of a
gravel extraction permitf: the withdrawal of planning permission": the
forfeiture of an airliner used to carry drugs"; and public health legislation
which made it impossible for the applicants to carry on their business of de-
boning cattle heads." On the other hand the court has stated on numerous
occasions that the question whether compensation has been paid - whether
the interference with the property was a matter of 'deprivation' or 'control
of use' - is an important ingredient in the assessment of the proportionality
of the interference.
The Strasbourg case law holds no c1ear indications whether the
reduction of pig-breeding rights should be interpreted as 'deprivation' or as
'control of use'. Anderson rightly concludes that 'the distinction between
deprivation and control, in the context of the duty to compensate, is an
untidy and unsatisfactory one'." For the time being, we tend to agree with
the view that the reduction of breeding rights should be seen as a form of de
facto expropriation and thus deprivation, because of the fact that the
breeding rights can be traded separately from other parts of the breeder's
businesses.38
29 J.E. Hoitink & caw. Backes, 'Eigendom van 'milieuvervuilingsrechten', NJB 1999, p. 1759-
1763.
30 D. Anderson, 'Compensation for Interference with Property', European Human Rights Laui
Review 1999,p. 543-558, particularly p. 550.
31 Idem., p. 551.
32 ECrtHR 21 February 1986Games and others/UK), Series A vol. 98.
33 ECrUiR 18 February 1991(Fredin/Sweden), Series A vol. 192.
34 ECrtHR 29November 1991(Pine Valley Developments/Ireland), Series A vol. 222.
35 ECrtHR 5 May 1995(Air Canada/UK), Series A vol. 316-A.
36 EComHR 21 October 1998{pinnacle Meat Processors/UK), Appl. no. 33298/96. The measures
complained of were taken because of the British BSE crisis.
37 Anderson 1999,supra note 30, p. 553.
38 Cf. P. de Haan, G.MF. Snijders & D.W. Bruil, 'Wet herstructurering varkenshouderij:
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Even if the reduction of breeding rights should be interpreted as control
of use, this form of control could hardly be compared to the Strasbourg
cases mentioned above, in which control without compensation was
allowed. In the case that resembles the Dutch situation best, the one of the
cattle de-boning businesses", the applicants were not compensated for the
losses" they complained about in Strasbourg, but did receive a considerable
amount of compensation on the basis of a genera! emergency aid scheme for
the slaughtering industry. Furthermore, the Commission considered that the
applicants were able to use their slaughtering plants for other de-boning
activities besides cattle de-boning," We cite a few passages from the Com-
mission's decision:
The Commission notes that in respect of 'eligible bovine products' owned by the
applicants on 9 April 1996, compensation was available under the Beef Stocks Transfer
Scheme element of the Slaughtering Industry (Emergency Aid) Scheme at a rate of 65%
of the pre-crisis value of the stocks. As the Govemment submit, six of the applicants
received payments under the scheme to a total value of over f430.000. (... )
[T]he Commission again notes that there is no agreement between the parties as to the
impact of the 1996 Orders on the applicants' material assets. However, (... ) some of the
assets were such as premises and motor vehicles whose value was largely independent
of the nature of the business. At least some of the specialised plant and tools were
capable of being used in the context of other meat operations, (... )
Whilst it is true that some of the applicants have now ceased their businesses as cattle
head de-boners, The Commission notes that they remain owners of all their tangible
assets, and that those assets can either be used in new or related businesses, or they can
be sold. Further, in respect of eligible beef stocks held on 9 April 1996, the applicants
have in fact received compensation totalling over f430.000.
Given these circumstances [italics added], the Commission does not accept that, overall, the
applicants can be said to have suffered an excessive burden.
All in all, the Strasbourg case law gives mixed signals as to the matter of
compensation in cases like the Dutch pig-breeding conflict. Perhaps this is
why the Court of Appeal in The Hague - which recently delivered judgment
in the appeal procedure - does leave the question whether a 25% reduction
of breeding rights without any form of compensation is justified somewhat
in the middle.
onrechtmatig en ondoelmatig', NJB 1998, p. 256-261; T. Barkhuysen & M.L. Van Emmerik,
'Eigendom en verkensrechten: de vervuiler betaalt', NJB 1999, p. 2024; P. de Haan, 'Begrips-
verwarring: varkensrechten zijn geen vervuilingsrechten', NJB 1999, p. 2022-2024; A.W.
Heringa inhisannotation to Rb Den Haag 23 February 1999,JB 1999,no, 61.
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40 These losses, according to the applicants' claims, consisted of their stock at the time of the
impugned measures, the assets of their businesses, and the goodwill, or the 'present value of
the future income stream which the company can be expected to derive'.
41 According to our information it is not quite that easy to use a pig-breeding sty for other
purposes besides pig-breeding. For pig-breeders to develop altemative activities on their
highly specialised premises very large investments will be necessary; most of the pig-
breeders will not be able to raise the needed amount of money.
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43 Hof Den Haag 20 January 2000, TB 2000, no. 59, annotated by F. Vemimmen-de Jong, also
published in NT-KORT 2000, 18. It is remarkable to see that the Court of Appeal scrutinises so
strictly the necessity of the governmental interference with the right to property. In expro-
priation cases based on the Expropriation Act the courts leave a wide margin of appreciation
to the administrative authorities as to the assessment of the necessity of the expropriation.
Although the ECHR does not prohibit such a marginal review by domestic courts and indeed
the European case law on Artiele 1 Protocol No. 1 underlines the wide margin of appreci-
ation that should be left to the national authorities when it comes to the necessity of the
interference, it can be argued that the existence and application of the margin of appreciation
doctrine at the European level should not be invoked to justify judicia! restraint by domestic
courts. On the contrary, the rationale of the doctrine (subsidiarity, better position of national
authorities) shows that it must be regarded as an implicit recognition of the duty of national
authorities (including the courts) to conduct a careful review on points of fact and law.
Another attitude might lead to an unacceptable decrease of the level of human rights
protection by the judiciary (J.G.c. Schokkenbroek, Toetsing aan de vrijheidsrechten van het
Europees Verdrag totbescherming van de rechten vandeMens. Een onderzoek naar de toetsing van de
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(Diss, Leiden), Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1996,P:517-519). In this light the strict scrutiny
applied by the Court of Appeal can be applauded.
The Court of Appeal does not interpret the reduction as deprivation of
possessions, but as control of use, Despite of the fact that the breeding rights
can be traded to other breeding businesses, the court considers that the
introduetion of breeding rights might best be compared to (conditions
attached to) public law permits. According to the court, the first 10%
reduction of breeding right envisaged in the Restructuring Act can not be
judged disproportionate, even without a form of financial compensation.
However, the second reduction of 15% the Restructuring Acts provides for
is judged 'unnecessary' to attain the objects of the Restructuring Act" and
therefore as a disproportionate interference in the right to property
guaranteed by Artiele 1.43 50, if the necessity of a further 15% reduction of
breeding rights could be established, this appeal judgment does not resolve
the question whether financial compensation for this second reduction
would be needed to strike a 'fair balance' between the general interest and
the right to property of the pig breeders.
The pig-breeding industry has announced to lodge an appeal with the
Supreme Court and continue proceeding to the European court of Human
Rights. 50 it remains to be seen what the exact consequences of Artiele 1 in
this conflict will be.
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